Postal address
Departament d'Economia, Universitat Rovira i Virgili
Avinguda de la Universitat 1, 43204 Reus ( Spain )
Email address
antonio.quesada@urv.cat
Permanent link at RePEc  
http://authors.repec.org/pro/pqu19/

A list of Economics journals with no submission fee

Publications
   
Social Choice and Welfare
2000Manipulability, unanimity, anonymity and merging functions17(3)481-516
2002More on independent decisiveness and Arrow’s theorem19(2)449-454
2003Positional independence in preference aggregation20(3)363-370
2005Abstention as an escape from Arrow's theorem25(1)221-226
   
Economics Bulletin
2001On the existence of self-enforcing equilibria3(5)1-5
2002Elasticity and revenue: a reappraisal4(13)1-5
2002From social choice functions to dictatorial social welfare functions 4(16)1-7
2003Negative results in the theory of games with lexicographic utilities 3(20)1-7
   
Mathematical Social Sciences
2001On expressing maximum information in extensive games42(2)161-167
2007Merging discrete evaluations54(1)25-34
   
Economics and Philosophy
2001The normal form is not sufficient17(2)235-243
   
Theory and Decision
2002Another impossibility result for normal form games52(1)73-80
2002 Power of enforcement and dictatorship52(4)381-387
2002Belief system foundations of backward induction
53(4)393-403
    
Economic Theory
2002Preference profiles sustaining Arrow’s theorem20(3)623-627
 
International Journal of Game Theory
2002A conflict between sequential rationality and consistency principles31(1)13-18
 
Review of Economic Design
2003Dictatorial voting operators 8(3)347-358
 
Research in Economics
2003(100 - 200/m)% veto power 57(2)83-92
 
International Game Theory Review
2003From common knowledge of rationality to backward induction5(2)127-137
 
European Journal of Political Economy
2005Selling a vote21(1)73-82
 
Journal of Mathematical Economics
2005A positional version of Arrow's theorem 41(8)1053-1059
 
Economics Letters
2006Hierarchical allocation91(1)98-103
 
Public Choice
20071 dictator = 2 voters
130(3-4)395-400
 
Journal of Informetrics
2009Monotonicity and the Hirsch index3(2)158-160
 
Journal of Public Economic Theory
2009Up/downward preference aggregation11(5)857-873
 
Scientometrics
2009More axiomatics for the Hirsch index  DOI 10.1007/s11192-009-0026-x


Working papers
 
167.1Consistency, unanimity and dictatorship12 Jan 2010
165.1We cannot choose among ourselves consistently12 Jan 2010
164.1Parallel axiomatizations of majority and unanimity16 Dec 2009
162.1Monotonicity + Efficiency + Continuity = Majority02 Jan 2010
161.2Decision by majority and the right to vote17 Dec 2009
158.4A short step between democracy and dictatorship08 Jan 200919 Dec 2009
155.2Allocation by coercion30 Nov 2009
147.4Axiomatics for the Hirsch research output index06 Oct 200818 Dec 2009
141.3Allocation of objects with conditional property rights13 Dec 200820 Dec 2009
138.9Autarky more likely than complete specialization04 Mar 200813 Jan 2010
130.8A simple sequential mechanism to allocate objects02 Jul 200730 Dec 2009
128.18Allocating objects using menus31 May 200701 Jan 2010


Other working papers

86   Nth Arrovian impossibility
13 March 2002 · 22 November 2008
122  Separable preference aggregation
5 May 2005
124  Allocation with self-exclusion
24 March 2006 · 10 January 2009
126  Competitive markets as two-player games
3 May 2007 · 23 December 2008
149  Another characterization of the Hirsch index 
9 November 2008
151  Three simple axiomatizations of the Hirsch index 
15 November 2008
156  Stable consistent allocation 
14 December 2008

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Last update: 13 January 2010