Departament d'Economia, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Avinguda de la Universitat 1, 43204 Reus (Spain)
aqa@urv.cat

http://authors.repec.org/pro/pqu19/  


Publications
2000
Manipulability, unanimity, anonymity and merging functions 
Social Choice and Welfare 17(3) 481-516

2001
On expressing maximum information in extensive games  Mathematical Social Sciences 42(2) 161-167
The normal form is not sufficient Economics and Philosophy 17(2) 235-243
On the existence of self-enforcing equilibria  Economics Bulletin 3(5) 1-5

2002
More on independent decisiveness and Arrow’s theorem Social Choice and Welfare 19(2) 449-454
Another impossibility result for normal form gamesTheory and Decision 52(1) 73-80
Power of enforcement and dictatorshipTheory and Decision 52(4) 381-387
Belief system foundations of backward induction Theory and Decision 53(4) 393-403
Preference profiles sustaining Arrow’s theorem Economic Theory 20(3) 623-627
A conflict between sequential rationality and consistency principles International Journal of Game Theory 31(1) 13-18
Elasticity and revenue: a reappraisal Economics Bulletin 4(13) 1-5
From social choice functions to dictatorial social welfare functions Economics Bulletin 4(16) 1-7

2003
Positional independence in preference aggregation Social Choice and Welfare 20(3) 363-370
Dictatorial voting operators Review of Economic Design 8(3) 347-358
(100 - 200/m)% veto power Research in Economics 57(2) 83-92
From common knowledge of rationality to backward induction International Game Theory Review 5(2) 127-137
Negative results in the theory of games with lexicographic utilities Economics Bulletin 3(20) 1-7

2005

Abstention as an escape from Arrow's theorem Social Choice and Welfare 2(5) 221-226
Selling a vote European Journal of Political Economy 21(1) 73-82
A positional version of Arrow's theorem  Journal of Mathematical Economics 41(8) 1053-1059

2006

Hierarchical allocation Economics Letters 91(1) 98-103

2007

1 dictator = 2 voters Public Choice 130(3-4) 395-400
Merging discrete evaluations Mathematical Social Sciences 54(1) 25-34

2009

Up/downward preference aggregation Journal of Public Economic Theory 11(5) 857-873
Monotonicity and the Hirsch index Journal of Informetrics 3(2) 158-160

2010
More axiomatics for the Hirsch index Scientometrics 82(2) 413-418
Monotonicity + efficiency + continuity = majority Mathematical Social Sciences 60(2) 149-154
Two axioms for the majority rule Economics Bulletin 30(4) 3033-3037

2011

Further characterizations of the Hirsch index  Scientometrics 87(1) 107-114
Axiomatics for the Hirsch index and the Egghe index  Journal of Informetrics 5(3) 476-480
Parallel axiomatizations of majority and unanimity  Economics Letters 111(2) 151-154
Unconcerned groups and the majority rule  Economics Bulletin 31(2) 1757-1764

2012
A short step between democracy and dictatorship  Theory and Decision 72(2) 149-166
Unanimous, reducible, anonymous social choice
Economics Bulletin 32(1) 242-250

2013
The majority rule with a chairman
Social Choice and Welfare 40(3) 679-691
The majority rule with arbitrators
Group Decision and Negotiation 22(2) 321-330
To majority through the search for unanimity Journal of Public Economic Theory 15(5) 729–735

2014
Taking alleged dictatorship more seriously: Rejoinder to Fried
Public Choice 158(1) 253-259


Last update: 6 June 2016